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Introduction
Tang,  Chen, and Lin, C. (2008) define
financial reporting quality as the extent to which
the financial statements provide true and fair view
of the underlying performance and financial
position.  However, Jonas and Blanchet (2000)
provide a commonly accepted definition, as
quality financial reporting is full and transparent
financial information that is not designed to
obfuscate or mislead users. In the words of
Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft (2004) financial
reporting quality refers to how well financial
information of a company reflects the true
economic circumstances of the company.
From the above expressions, it may be
understood that financial reporting is an efficient
tool for management to communicate the
performance of the company to stakeholders, as
they base their resource allocation decisions on
financial information, thus, the financial reporting
quality is a prerequisite for efficient capital
markets. The following two general perspectives,
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This study examines audit committee quality and its relationship with financial
reporting quality. The population of this study consists of the companies listed in
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) between years 2002 and 2012. Using Godden
sample size formula, 133 companies are selected randomly for the study. It is
found that in most of the equity based listed companies at BSE under study have
complied with the legal formalities, for instance, appointment of independent
directors, number of meetings, size of the audit committee, legal qualifications
and financial qualifications of the directors, as they were required for the listing
at a stock exchange in India. Further, the analysis and tests state that board size,
audit committee meetings and its size have relationship with the financial
reporting practices, but the CEO tenure and hold, board independence, net
income, proportion of independent directors on board, legal qualifications and
financial qualifications of the directors and overlap of audit committee members
on compensation committee, have no influence on the financial reporting
practices. Thus, it may be inferred that the companies may improve the financial
reporting quality, by managing the board size, audit committee meetings and size,
as these characteristics have significant relationship with financial reporting
quality.
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described by Jonas and Blanchet (2000) are widely
used to assess financial reporting quality: (1) The
first perspective relies on the needs of users and
emphasizes that the quality of financial reporting
is determined on the basis of the usefulness of the
financial information to its users; (2) The second
perspective focuses on the necessity of financial
reporting quality for shareholder and investor
protection.
In other words, the first perspective known as
the user needs perspective is mainly concerned
with the provision of relevant information to users
for making decisions, whereas, the second
perspective known as, shareholder/investor
protection perspective aims at ensuring that the
transparent and competent information provided
to users is sufficient for their needs.
The utility of financial reports and their
quality is further examined by Schipper and
Vincent (2003) as the financial reporting quality is
very important, and necessity to users to move
decision as they need reliable financial
information to base their resource allocation
decisions. Specifically, auditors, management,
audit committees, and boards of directors, have an
interest in high quality financial reports to reduce
the cost of capital and attract potential investors,
for which they follow rules and regulations
developed by the regulators and standard setters
by promulgating necessary rules that aim for the
effectiveness of capital markets.
Thus, the concept of financial reporting
quality is broad and significant as it states the
quality or useful financial information, disclosure
practices and non-financial information to help in
decision making, where the role of audit
committee members assumes a greater
significance in ensuring the financial reporting
quality.
In this context, an attempt is made to establish
the relationship conceptually between financial
reporting quality and audit committee quality
characteristics; to examine how the top
management discharged their financial reporting
responsibilities to ensure the financial reporting
quality.
Evaluating financial reporting quality is a part
of the corporate oversight responsibilities of Audit
Committees and one of the primary functions of
audit committees is to monitor the financial
reporting system of the firm, and contribute to
corporate control, hence, the audit committees are
expected to improve the financial reporting quality
of a company.
Realizing the importance of the audit
committee in ensuring the financial reporting
quality, India began to think in terms of Audit
Committees, and has been gaining popularity since
1980. In 1991, the economic reforms placed a
great importance on the role of the audit
committee, and in 1992, the stock market scam
and liberalization of the economy led to the
introduction of audit committee requirements. In
1998, constitution of audit committees was
recommended by the Confederation of Indian
Industries (CII) in its Code of Corporate
Governance, which is the first and unique instance
of an industry association taking the lead in
prescribing audit committee standards for listed
companies.
The Reserve Bank of India, in 1999, made it
mandatory for all listed banks to establish audit
committees as a sub-committee of Board of
Directors constituted with non-executive directors,
which were to be a liaison between the internal
and external auditors and the board of directors.
Furthermore, the Companies Act – Amendment
(2000, Section 29A) provided for the formation
and functioning of audit committees and contains
a provision that every public company having
paid-up capital of Rs. 5,00,00,000 or more must
establish an Audit Committee. Similar
requirements for audit committees are prescribed
under clause 49 of the Listing Agreement issued
by Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI), which required all listed companies must
have a qualified and an independent Audit
Committee, generally consisting of non-executive
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directors. This clause was amended in 2004. The
non-executive director requirement was removed
and replaced with specification that the audit
committees should have a minimum of three
members with two-thirds of them being
independent, and made it mandatory that all
companies listed on the stock exchanges had to
establish audit committees in their companies.
Sarkar and Sarkar (2010), in their study, found
that a majority of companies have adhered to this
regulation and have constituted audit committees
with the minimum size of three, as required under
the regulations.
It is stipulated by Section 292A of Companies
Act, 1956, that an Audit Committee should have
discussions with the auditors periodically about
internal control systems, ensure compliance of
internal control systems, and scrutinize the scope
of audit including the observations of auditors and
review of the half yearly and annual financial
statements before submission to the Board and that
an Audit Committee shall have authority to
investigate into anything in relation to such
matters and shall have full access to information
contained in records of the company.
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement empowers
the Audit Committee to investigate any activity
within its terms of reference, seek information
from any employee, obtains outside advice and
secure attendance of outsiders, if necessary.
Within its purview lies the responsibility  to
recommend the appointment and removal of
external auditor, fix audit fees, approve payment
for other services, review with the management
the annual financial statements before submission
to the Board, review the adequacy of internal
control system, oversight of the financial reporting
process of the company, disclosure of financial
information to ensure that financial statements are
correct, sufficient and credible; review the
adequacy of internal audit function;  review the
financial and risk management policies of the
company; review the functioning of whistle
blower policy and look into reasons for substantial
defaults.
In summary, through the intervention of
premier industrial association the Confederation of
Indian Industries (CII), the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) and statutory and regulatory bodies like The
Company Act and Listing Agreement (SEBI),
India has developed a strong and empowered
culture of Audit Committees in companies that
perform their functions credibly.
The next section, literature review, describes
state of art and previous studies’ result as well as
proposed hypotheses. Following that, research
method section provides detailed research design
and data analysis method. The research findings
are discussed in the next section before research
conclusion.
Literature Review
In the post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) era,
monitoring the financial reporting quality of a
company, is recognized as a central concern of the
of audit committees for the smooth functioning of
capital markets, and became as the primary focus
of corporate governance reform. Early accounting
focused on research whether the existence of an
audit committee improved financial reporting
quality of firms and the general finding was that
there is a positive association between the
presence of an audit committee and the financial
reporting quality of the firm. In this context, Wild
(1996) found too, that the earnings response
coefficients for companies with audit committees
were higher after the appointment of the audit
committee.  Therefore, the focus of recent research
has been specifically on the characteristics of audit
committees and their association with proxies of
financial reporting quality of the firm. More
particular, independence and financial expertise
are two major attributes of the audit committee
were focused much in research literature [see for
example Klein (2002) and DeFond, Hann and Hu
(2005)]. A strong proponent of independence,
Securities and Exchange Commission (1999)
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argue that audit committees consisting of
independent directors would lead to higher
financial reporting quality, because they would
have reduced conflicts of interest and lessened
incentive to sacrifice objectivity. Consistent with
this argument, the research concluded by Klein
(2002), Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002), Bedard,
Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Persons (2004)
and Archambeault, Dezoort and Hermanson
(2008), show that audit committee independence
reduce earnings management, or the likelihood of
financial reporting restatement and financial
reporting fraud.
Krishnan (2005) stated that independent audit
committees are significantly less likely to be
associated with the incidence of internal control
problems over financial reporting. Whereas,
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2009),
concluded that the previous quantitative studies
found that higher quality financial reporting and
auditing is associated with more independent,
expert and diligent audit committees. To sum up,
Empirical evidence that the independence of audit
committees enhance the quality of financial
reporting has been revealed by many studies.
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) had
advised that, considering the complexities of
financial reporting at least a subset of audit
committees should have financial reporting
expertise, as Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003)
documented that the performance of an audit
committee is enhanced when audit committees
have members with financial expertise.
The research has consistently found that it is
specifically accounting financial expertise of the
Audit Committee that yields monitoring benefits.
One recent study, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein
and Neal (2010), used post-SOX data to show that
the positive association between accounting
financial expertise and financial reporting quality
(discretionary accruals) holds true only for firms
with weak corporate governance systems,
suggesting that, in the post-SOX era, audit
committee accounting expertise substitutes for
other corporate governance mechanisms.
Therefore, the appointment of an accounting
expert could only improve financial reporting
quality when there are complimentary governance
provisions (Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and
Neal, 2008). On the other hand, firms with strong
corporate governance may exert stronger control
over the firm's financial reporting decisions,
irrespective of the activities of the audit
committee, and thus reduce the impact of audit
committee financial expertise on the financial
reporting quality of the firm (Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson and Lapides, 2000).
Audit Committees play a very prominent role
today in overseeing and monitoring the
participation of the management and the
independent auditor in the financial reporting
process. Some of studies have in later period also
shown that audit committees recruit members with
significant accounting expertise and that they are
involved in substantive financial reporting and
oversight practices, assessing the subjective
judgments of the management, meeting more
frequently, and more often disagreeing with the
accounting and reporting decisions of the
management.
If an audit committee does not possess
accounting expertise, and the lack of accounting
expertise results in inadequate financial
monitoring,  appointing an accounting expert
introduces a monitor who is intimately familiar
with the financial reporting process, and the new
accounting skills allow the audit committee to
more effectively monitor the reporting decisions
of the managers, then improvements in financial
reporting quality would be largest for firms that
appointed their first accounting expert. DeFond,
Hann, and Hu (2005), provided evidence that
accounting skills enhanced the ability of the audit
committee to oversee high-quality financial
reporting.
Some studies mentioned that audit Committee
size (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001) and number of
5
Kanukuntla S. and Seyed Masoud Sajjadian A./ Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 4(1), 2017, pp 1-18
its meetings (Menon and Williams, 1994) are the
other dimensions of audit committees that have
been found to be associated with financial
reporting outcomes. As the audit committee
characteristics have relationship with financial
reporting quality, the committees may have a role
in reducing in financial statements fraud.
The relationship between audit committees
and financial statements fraud has been
extensively studied and analyzed. Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney (1996) examined the companies that
were required to accounting enforcement actions
by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
breach of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and found that companies which were
manipulating their earnings were less likely to
have an audit committee. This is supported by
McMullen (1996), who examined the five
potential consequences of audit committees and
the occurrence of errors, irregularities and illegal
acts relating to financial reporting, and concluded
that the companies that had Audit Committees
displayed more reliable financial reporting.
Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) found that
firms with audit committees constituted with
independent directors, and met at least twice a
year, were less likely to be fraudulent or
misleading financial reporting. Further, the
findings of Song and Windram (2004) suggested
that the financial literacy of audit committees and
their activity level contributed to greater
probability of companies complying with financial
reporting standards.
The above review of literature may reveal that
the studies were conducted by taking up one issue
at a time and in a different environment. No study
is provided on the analysis of effectiveness of
select audit committee qualities on financial
reporting quality in Indian context, hence, the
present study is taken up to fill up the gap, with
the following research methodology expressed in
terms of objectives, sample design, tools and
limitations, whereas, hypotheses and models
adopted for the study are presented under the test
of hypothesis:
Audit committees have attracted
considerable attention from researchers due to the
recent high profile financial reporting scandals, as
the audit committee’s play crucial role in the
financial reporting processes of firms and hold
more responsibility in evaluating financial
reporting quality. In this context, a null hypothesis
is set as below to test the relationship between
audit committee quality and financial reporting
quality:
H01: There is no relationship between audit
committee quality and financial reporting
quality.
Research Method
The objective of this study is to examine the
relationship between audit committee quality and
financial reporting quality and measuring the
effect of audit committee characteristics quality on
corporate governance quality. From 15916
companies listed at Bombay Stock Exchange as on
8.11.2012, 3879 companies are considered based
on equity and listing, out of which 133 companies
are selected randomly and information relating to
financial year 2002-03 to 2011-12 are considered
for this study. This study uses the formula given
by Godden (2004) to justify the size of sample, as
the study uses descriptive statistics dealing with
probability and the population is finite. In this
study, as public limited companies having a paid-
up capital of at least Rs.5,00,00,000, shall
constitute a Committee of the Board known as
Audit Committee (As required by section 292A of
the Companies Act.1956), only listed companies
which have Audit Committees are considered.
The data, related to the select characteristics
and terms used in the models for analysis are
collected from the annual reports of the select
companies and notes and statements given in
them. The period of the study is recent 10 years,
i.e. from 2002-'03 to 2011-'12.
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The study uses Pearson Correlation
Coefficient, Regression analysis to establish the
relationship between the variables. T-test and
ANOVA are used to test the effect of the
independent variable on the dependent variable
and to test the stated hypotheses. Statistical
Software-SPSS is used for the purpose of
processing data to arrive at relevant measures of
analysis.
To test the above hypothesis the following
model developed by Chandar, Chang, Zhenget al
(2012), to examine the relationship between
boards of directors’ quality and financial reporting
quality, is used as a basis:
In(ABS_PMDA)it = β0 + β1OVERLAPit_P + β2BD_INDit + β3BDSIZE + β4CEO_TENUREit
+β5CEO_HOLDit + β6ABS_ ΔNIit + β7L-ASSETSit + β8ln(ASSETS)it + εit
Where,
ABS_PMDA, the dependent variable, is the
natural log of the absolute value of abnormal
accrual measured by the Performance Matched
Modified Jones model (2005) (Kothari, Andrew
and Wasley, 2005).
OVERLAP_P is measured as the proportion of
audit committee members who also sit on the
compensation committee.
BD_IND measures board independence and is
defined as the proportion of independent board
directors.
BD_SIZE is the number of board directors.
CEO_TENURE is measured as the number of
years the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
has been in his or her position.
CEO_HOLD is the proportion of common equity
owned by the CEO.
ABS_ΔNI is the absolute value of the change in
net income between previous year and current year
divided by last year’s assets.
L-ASSETS is financial leverage defined as the
long-term debt divided by last year’s assets.
ln(ASSETS) represents firm size measured as the
natural log of total assets.
ε
i,t
is Error term in year t for firm i.
β0 is a constant
β is the slope (also called the regression
coefficient)
Where,
PMDA (Performance Matched Discretionary
Accruals), an indicator of financial reporting
quality, is determined by modified Kothari – Jones
Model as stated below:
PMDA= TA
i,t
/A
it-1
– NDAit / Ait-1
Here,
TA
i,t
/A
it-1
is determined by using modified
Jones model as,
TA
i,t
/A
it-1
= α
i
[1/A
it-1
] + β
1i
[ΔREV
it
- ΔREC
it
/A
it-1
] + β
2i
[PPE
it
/A
it-1
] + ε
i,t
Where,
TA
i,t
- Total accruals in year t for firm i (measured
by operating profit after tax – cash flow from
operations);
A
it-1
- Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i;
ΔREV
it
- Revenues in year t less revenues in year t
- 1 for firm i;
ΔREC
it
- Net receivables in year t less net
receivables in year t - 1 for firm i;
PPE
it
- Gross property, plant and equipment in
year t for firm i;
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ε
i,t
- Error term in year t for firm i. and,
NDAit / Ait-1is ascertained by using the
following Performance-Matching Model of
modified Jones models, developed by Kothari,
Leone, and Wasley5.
NDAit / Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i[ΔREVit - ΔRECit /Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] +  β3iROAit-1 +εi,t
Where,
ROAtis (income before extraordinary items for
year t / Ait-1) * 100.
As stated earlier, in  order to meet the
objectives of the present study, the above
Performance Matched Jones Modified Model
(ABS_ PMDA), is extended by adding the terms
representing the select audit committee
characteristics such as, ACIND, ACLEGEX,
ACACCEX, ACMEET, ACSIZE, as a result of
which, the following equation is emerged and used
to test the above stated hypothesis:
In(ABS_PMDA)it = β0 +β1OVERLAPit_P+ +β2BD_INDit + β3BDSIZE + β4CEO_TENUREit +β5CEO_HOLDit +
β6ACIND + β7ACLEGEX + β8ACACCEX + β9ACMEET + β10ACSIZE + β11ABS_ ΔNIit +
β12L-ASSETSit + β13ln(ASSETS)it + εit
Where, the notation of some terms such as,
ABS_PMDA, OVERLAP_P, BD_IND, BD_SIZE,
CEO_TENURE, CEO_HOLD, ABS_ΔNI, L-
ASSETS, ln(ASSETS) and εi,t, is given already in
the context of model given up Nandini et al.
Whereas, the notation of other terms is as
follows:
ACIND is proportion of independent directors on
audit committee.
ACLEGEX is proportion of directors on audit
committee with legal qualifications.
ACACCEX is proportion of directors on audit
committee with accounting qualifications.
ACMEET is number of audit committee meeting
for the year.
ACSIZE is number of audit committee members.
With the help of above equation, mean,
standard deviation and correlation measures were
computed and presented in table-1 and 2
respectively, and followed by the analysis.
Table-1
Mean and Standard Deviation of Directors Board and Audit Committee Quality and Financial
Reporting quality
No. Variables N Mean Std. Deviation
1 InABS_PMDA 1330 0.764 0.560
2 OVERLAP_P 1330 0.439 0.766
3 BD_IND 1330 0.560 1.516
4 BDSIZE 1330 8.26 3.148
5 CEOTENURE 1330 6.83 2.542
6 CEO_HOLD 1330 6.28 9.335
7 ACIND 1330 0.795 0.202
8 ACLEGEX 1330 0.286 0.059
9 ACACCEX 1330 0.601 0.076
10 ACMEET 1330 4.55 1.435
11 ACSIZE 1330 3.73 0.956
12 ABS_∆NI 1330 3.765 67.874
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No. Variables N Mean Std. Deviation
13 L_ASSETS 1330 0.092 0.244
14 ASSETS 1330 3.338 0.980
15 Valid N 1330
Source: Data extracted from Annual reports
The following may be inferred from the above
table:
i) The financial reporting quality measured in
terms of the mean value of Performance
Matched Discretionary Accrual
(ABS_PMDA) is 0.76 million, and the
Standard Deviation is 0.56 million, may
reveal that all companies having an Audit
Committee reflect a similar Performance
Matched Discretionary Accruals.
ii) The mean value of proportion of audit
committee members who also sit on the
compensation committee (OVERLAP_P) is
equal to 44 percent with standard deviation
equal to 76 percent. A higher deviation that
shows a significant dispersion from the
mean, may explain that a remarkable
number of firms do not have an overlap of
Audit Committee Members on
Compensation Committee members. This
may be due to the fact that members of
Compensation Committee are not always
drawn from members of the Audit
Committee.
iii) The average value of proportion of
independent board directors in the total
board of directors (BD_IND) is equal to 0.56
percent with standard deviation equal to 1.5
percent. The low Standard Deviation reveals
that the proportion of Independent Members
on the Board of all the firms under study is
very similar.
iv) The mean value of board size (BDSIZE) is
8.2 members and Standard Deviation is 3.1
members. The moderate Standard Deviation
reveals that there is a fair percentage of
dispersal from the mean in the value of
board size among the firms under study. The
reason for this may be the firms under study
have a wide range of members in their
Board.
v) The mean value of number of years the
current CEO in position (CEO_TENUR) is
6.8 years with standard deviation of 2.5
years, showing that there is a negligible
deviation from the mean, and that there is a
reasonable range in the tenures of the CEOs
of the firms under study.
vi) The mean of proportion of common equity
owned by CEO (CEO_HOLD) is equal to 60
percent with standard deviation equal to 9.33
percent. The high standard deviation shows
that the proportion of common equity owned
by the CEOs differ significantly. In other
words, the equity ownership varied from
firm to firm during the period of study.
vii) The independence of audit committee
(ACIND) represented by the mean value of
proportion of independent directors on audit
committee (80%) and a standard deviation
(20%), revealed that the audit committees of
the firms under study have adhered to the
requirement of Clause 49 of Listing
Agreement (SEBI) 2005, which stipulates
“all listed companies should have an Audit
Committee, consisting of minimum three
directors as members, of which two-third
shall be independent”
viii) The average of proportion of directors on
audit committee with legal qualifications
(ACLEGEX) value is (29%), while standard
deviation equal to (6%). The Clause 49 of
Listing Agreement (SEBI) 2005, stipulates
that “the company secretary of the firm must
also be the Secretary of the Audit
Committee”, which brings into the Audit
Committee the necessary legal input that is
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required by the standard formula for
Earnings Quality demands that the legal
qualification of the Audit Committee
members be taken as a variable in the
computation of Earnings Quality. Hence, it
may be concluded that the most of the
companies in India have at least one audit
committee member with legal knowledge
and there is variation from a company to
company in this regards.
ix) The mean value of proportion of directors on
audit committee with accounting
qualification (ACACCEX) is 60% and
standard deviation is8%, revealing that there
is a low dispersal from the mean, which may
explain that the majority of the Audit
Committees of the firms under study  have
the required number of members with
financial and accounting qualification, as
specified by  the Companies (Amendment)
Act (2000) and Clause 49 of Listing
Agreement (SEBI)2005 which states that“a
minimum of three members, all being
nonexecutive directors, with the majority of
them being independent directors, with at
least one director having financial and
accounting knowledge.”
x) The mean value of audit committee meetings
is around 5 times and Standard Deviation is
1.4 times. The low Standard Deviation
reveal that the Audit Committees Meet
(ACMEET) regularly as stipulated by
Section 292A of Companies Act 1956, and
Clause 49 of Listing Agreement (SEBI)
2005, which lay down that “the Audit
Committee should meet at least four times in
a year and not more than four months shall
elapse between two meetings.”
xi) The mean value of audit committee size is
3.7 members and Standard Deviation is 0.95
members, showing that the dispersion from
the mean is low and that the most of the
Audit Committees of the firms under study
adhered to the size of the Committee
(ACSIZE), stipulated by clause 49 of Listing
Agreement (SEBI) 2005, and Section 292A
of the Companies Act 1956, both of which
require that “the audit committee shall
consist of not less than three directors
/members”.
xii) The mean value of absolute value of the
change in net income (ABS_ΔNI) is 3.76
million and standard deviation is 67.87
million. The high Standard Deviation shows
that there has been more or less a uniform
change in the net income of the firms under
study.
xiii) The mean value of long-term debt divided
by last year’s assets (L-ASSETS) is equal to
0.09 million with standard deviation equal to
0.24 million. The reasonably high Standard
Deviation reveals that there is a significant
difference in the mean value of L-ASSETS
of the firms under study, indicating that
there could be remarkable variation in either
the amount of long-term debts of firms or in
their previous year’s assets.
xiv) On the whole, it may be concluded that the
most of the equity based listed companies at
BSE under study revealed the varied facts
related to compensation committee,
independency of the directors, the size of the
board of directors, tenure and equity owned
by CEO and net income. The reason for the
longer tenure in the Board and committees
might be the members want to stick to the
organizations as they saw them growing.
Whereas, the constitution of the audit
committees in Indian companies are based
on the requirement of the various statutes,
hence the variability is very less from their
respective means.
After knowing the means and variability of
the terms of Performance Matched Jones Modified
Model, an attempt is made to measure the
relationship between the terms and the values are
presented in table-2. A close observation of the
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table may reveal the following relationships
between the characteristics of audit committee
quality and directors’ board quality, and financial
reporting quality, expressed in terms of
Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals
(AB_PMDA):
i) Financial reporting quality expressed in
terms of Performance Matched
Discretionary Accruals (ABS_PMDA) are
positively and significantly correlated with
number of board directors (BD_SIZE), audit
committee with independent members
(ACIND) and total assets (ASSETS). This
may indicate that PMDA increases with an
increase in the BD_SIZE, ACIND and total
assets of company.
ii) OVERLAP_P is positively and significantly
correlated with independency of the audit
committee (ACIND). This may indicate that
OVERLAP_P increase resulted in an
increase in ACIND.
iii) BD_IND is positively and significantly
correlated with number of independent
members in audit committee members
(ACIND). This may indicate that BD_IND
increases with an increase in the number of
independent members of Audit Committees
of companies, revealing that the companies’
preferred independent members on their
board of directors and audit committees.
iv) Number of Board Directors (BD_SIZE) is
negatively and significantly correlated with
CEO_TENURE and equity owned by the
CEO (CEO_HOLD), showing that with an
increase of the tenure of the CEO and an
increase in equity owned by the CEO, the
number of board members of the company
in the Audit Committee decreases. Whereas,
the number of board of directors (BD_SIZE)
is positively and statistically correlated with
ACIND, ACMEET and ACSIZE. This may
indicate that an increase of board members
may lead to an increase in the ACIND,
ACMEET and ACSIZE of the company.
The number of board directors (BD_SIZE) is
negatively and significantly correlated with
ACLEGEX and ACACCEX, showing that with an
increase of the ACLEGEX and ACACCEX, the
number of board members of the company
decreases or vice versa, which  may  indicate  that
the  qualifications  of audit committee members
affected the size of board of director negatively.
Further, the number of board directors (BD_SIZE)
and total assets (ASSETS) are positively and
significantly correlated, indicating that an increase
of board members in the Audit Committee
increases the total assets of the company.
CEO_TENURE and CEO_HOLD are
positively and significantly correlated. This
indicates that with an increase in the CEO tenure,
there is an increase in the CEO holding in the
company. Further, the study of relationship
between CEO_TENURE and audit committee
characteristics may reveal that the CEO_TENURE
has positively and significantly correlated with
ACLEGEX and ACACCEX. This indicates that an
increase in the CEO_ TENURE resulted in an
increase in the ACLEGEX and ACACCEX of the
company. Whereas, CEO_TENURE and ACSIZE
are negatively and significantly
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Table-2
Correlation between Board of Directors and Audit Committee Quality and Financial Reporting Quality
No. PMDA OVERLAP_P BD_IND BD-SIZE
CEO_
TENURE
CEO_
HOLD ACIND
ACLEGEX ACACCEX ACMEET ACSIZE ABS_ΔNI L_ASSETS ASSETS
1 PMDA Pearson
Correlation
1 0.018 0.009 0.215** -0.016 -0.028 0.061* -0.048 -0.005 0.014 0.025 -0.021 0.052 0.179**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.509 0.733 0.000 0.572 0.301 0.026 0.079 0.845 0.616 0.366 0.440 0.060 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
2 OVERLA
P_P
Pearson
Correlation
0.018 1 0.025 0.012 -0.012 -0.023 0.070* -0.009 -0.018 0.027 -0.019 0.001 0.015 0.028
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.509 0.365 0.652 0.668 0.410 0.010 0.747 0.515 0.332 0.483 0.973 0.593 0.309
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
3 BD_IND Pearson
Correlation
0.009 0.025 1 -0.013 0.012 -0.018 0.066* 0.019 0.020 0.009 -0.021 -0.002 0.006 -0.027
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.733 0.365 0.639 0.652 0.524 0.017 0.480 0.473 0.746 0.436 0.933 0.819 0.320
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
4 BD-SIZE Pearson
Correlation
0.215** 0.012 -0.013 1 -0.125** -0.089** 0.110** -0.336** -0.171** 0.259** 0.389** -0.043 0.005 0.580**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.652 0.639 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.867 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
5 CEO_TEN
URE
Pearson
Correlation
-0.016 -0.012 0.012 -0.125** 1 0.086** -0.008 0.065* 0.086** -0.017 -0.165** 0.035 -0.089** -0.198**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.572 0.668 0.652 0.000 0.002 0.773 0.017 0.002 0.539 0.000 0.196 0.001 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
6 CEO_HO
LD
Pearson
Correlation
-0.028 -0.023 -0.018 -0.089** 0.086** 1 -0.059* 0.113** 0.053 -0.082** -0.130** -0.023 0.017 -0.171**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.301 0.410 0.524 0.001 0.002 0.032 0.000 0.054 0.003 0.000 0.405 0.542 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
7 ACIND Pearson
Correlation
0.061* 0.070* 0.066* 0.110** -0.008 -0.059* 1 0.170** 0.026 0.056* -0.214** -0.008 -0.055* 0.173**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 0.010 0.017 0.000 0.773 0.032 0.000 0.345 0.041 0.000 0.766 0.044 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
8 ACLEGE
X
Pearson
Correlation
-0.048 -0.009 0.019 -0.336** 0.065* 0.113** 0.170** 1 0.450** -0.087** -0.776** 0.054* 0.049 -0.259**
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No. PMDA OVERLAP_P BD_IND BD-SIZE
CEO_
TENURE
CEO_
HOLD ACIND
ACLEGEX ACACCEX ACMEET ACSIZE ABS_ΔNI L_ASSETS ASSETS
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.079 0.747 0.480 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.072 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
9 ACACCE
X
Pearson
Correlation
-0.005 -0.018 0.020 -0.171** 0.086** 0.053 0.026 0.450** 1 -0.086** -0.402** 0.024 0.026 -0.227**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.845 0.515 0.473 0.000 0.002 0.054 0.345 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.376 0.345 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
10 ACMEET Pearson
Correlation
0.014 0.027 0.009 0.259** -0.017 -0.082** 0.056* -0.087** -0.086** 1 0.129** -0.002 -0.085** 0.412**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.616 0.332 0.746 0.000 0.539 0.003 0.041 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.948 0.002 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
11 ACSIZE Pearson
Correlation
0.025 -0.019 -0.021 0.389** -0.165** -0.130** -0.214** -0.776** -0.402** 0.129** 1 -0.043 -0.031 0.282**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.366 0.483 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.121 0.266 0.000
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
12 ABS_ΔNI Pearson
Correlation
-0.021 0.001 -0.002 -0.043 0.035 -0.023 -0.008 0.054* 0.024 -0.002 -0.043 1 0.001 -0.075**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.440 0.973 0.933 0.114 0.196 0.405 0.766 0.048 0.376 0.948 0.121 0.980 0.006
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
13 L_ASSET
S
Pearson
Correlation
0.052 0.015 0.006 0.005 -0.089** 0.017 -0.055* 0.049 0.026 -0.085** -0.031 0.001 1 -0.090**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.060 0.593 0.819 0.867 0.001 0.542 0.044 0.072 0.345 0.002 0.266 0.980 0.001
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
14 ASSETS Pearson
Correlation
0.179** 0.028 -0.027 0.580** -0.198** -0.171** 0.173** -0.259** -0.227** 0.412** 0.282** -0.075** -0.090** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.309 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001
N 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330 1330
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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correlated, this may indicate that the
ACSIZE of the company is decreased when
the CEO_TENURE is increased.
CEO_TENURE is negatively and
significantly correlated with L_ASSETS, i.e long-
term debts divided by last year’s assets and total
assets. This indicates that the leverage and total
assets of the company decreased when the
CEO_TENURE increased.
i) CEO_ HOLD is negatively and significantly
correlated with ACIND, ACMEET,
ACSIZE, indicating that ACIND, ACMEET
and ACSIZE of the company decreased
when the equity owned by CEO increased.
Whereas, CEO_ HOLD is positively and
significantly correlated with ACLEGEX and
ACACCEX. This may indicate that an
increase in the CEO tenure increases the
ACLEGEX and ACACCEX in the company.
Further, CEO_ HOLD and ASSETS are
negatively and significantly correlated,
indicating that the total assets of the
company decreased when the equity owned
by CEO increased.
ii) ACIND is positively and significantly
correlated with ACLEGEX and ACMEET
and ASSETS. This indicates that an increase
in the ACIND resulted in an increase in the
ACLEGEX, ACMEET and ASSETS of the
select companies. ACIND is negatively and
significantly correlated with ACSIZE and
L_ASSETS, indicating that the ACSIZE and
L_ASSETS of the companies are decreased
when the ACIND increased.
iii) ACLEGEX is positively and significantly
correlated with ACACCEX and ABS_ΔNI,
revealing that with an increase in the
ACLEGEX, there is an increase in the
ACACCEX and ABS_ΔNI of the select
companies. ACLEGEX is negatively and
significantly correlated with ACMEET and
ACSIZE and ASSETS, showing that the
ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS of the
select companies are decreased when the
ACLEGEX increased.
iv) ACACCEX is negatively and significantly
correlated with ACMEET and ACSIZE and
ASSETS. This shows that with an increase
of the ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS,
the ACACCEX of the company decreases.
v) ACMEET is positively and significantly
correlated with ACSIZE and ASSETS,
revealing that with an increase in the
ACMEET, there is an increase in the
ACSIZE and ASSETS in the company.
ACMEET and L_ASSETS are negatively
and significantly correlated, showing that
with an increase of the L_ASSETS, the
ACMEET of the company decreases.
vi) ACSIZE and ASSETS are positively and
significantly correlated. This indicates that
with an increase in the ACSIZE, there is an
increase in the ASSETS in the company.
vii) ABS_∆NI and ASSETS are negatively and
significantly correlated, which implies that
as the net income of the company rises, the
total assets of the company decreases.
viii) L-ASSETS with ASSETS are negatively and
significantly correlated, from which it may
be inferred that the decrease in long-term
debts of a company, increases its ASSETS.
In brief, it may be concluded from the above
stated findings of the present study that the
discretionary accruals increases with the size of
the board of directors and the assets for the reason
that the choices increase with an increase in the
size of the board and assets’ volume. The long-
term stay by the CEO in the company or the long-
term holding of the equity has a negative impact
on the discretionary accruals. The board size,
leverage with assets base are positively and
significantly related. An interesting fact may be
noticed from the study that, Board size and assets
base, and CEO tenure and the equity holding of
the CEO are going hand in hand. This may be due
to the expansion of the size of the company and an
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increase in the board size with a preference to stay
for a long time.
After analyzing the relationships, ANOVA is
used to test the presumption that board of directors
and audit committee quality has no relationship
with financial reporting quality and the values are
presented in the following table–3:
Table-3:
ANOVA table for Directors Board and Audit Committee Quality and Financial Reporting Quality
Model Sum of Squares (SS) DF (V) Mean Square (MS) F Sig.
Regression 27.376 13 2.106 7.107 0.000
Residual 389.929 1316 0.296
Total 417.305 1329
Source: Data extracted from Annual reports
In the above table, the F-ratio for the
regression model is computed by taking a ratio of
Mean Square (MS) Regression to Mean Square
Residual, and which is equal to 7.107
(2.106/0.296). The test of significance reveals that
the probability of obtaining F-stat as the one or
more extremes from F distribution on 13 and 1316
degrees of freedom is less than 5% level of
significance. Hence, there may be no difference in
mean values of board of directors and audit
committee quality characteristics and financial
reporting quality measures, thus this study rejects
the null hypothesis, and conclude that the
alternative hypothesis may be accepted, which
means, there is a relationship between the
characteristics of the board of directors and audit
committees and financial reporting quality.
Further, the impact of characteristics of directors
of board and audit committee on the financial
reporting quality is measured by t-test. The values
of which are presented in table-4:
Table-4:
Coefficients table for Directors Board and Audit Committee Quality and Financial Reporting
Quality
Model Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error
(Constant) 0.507 0.257 1.970 0.049
OVERLAP_P 0.008 0.020 0.397 0.691
BD_IND 0.005 0.010 0.466 0.641
BDSIZE 0.033 0.006 5.319 0.000
CEOTENURE 0.005 0.006 0.825 0.410
CEO_HOLD 0.000 0.002 -0.218 0.827
ACIND 0.033 0.079 0.416 0.678
ACLEGEX -0.482 0.414 -1.163 0.245
ACACCEX 0.227 0.221 1.026 0.305
ACMEET -0.029 0.012 -2.480 0.013
ACSIZE -0.055 0.026 -2.080 0.038
ABS_ΔNI 0.000 0.000 -0.243 0.808
L_ASSETS 0.132 0.062 2.128 0.034
ASSETS 0.074 0.021 3.529 0.000
Source: Data extracted from Annual reports
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Table-4 indicates that except, CONSTANT,
BDSIZE, ACMEET, ACSIZE, L-ASSETS and
ASSETS, the null hypotheses for all other
variables, such as, OVERLAP_P, BD_IND,
CEO_TENURE, CEO_HOLD, ACIND,
ACLEGEX, ACACCEX and ABS_∆NI are
accepted. In other words, for the CONSTANT,
BDSIZE, ACMEET, ACSIZE, L-ASSETS and
ASSETS, H0 is rejected, from which it may be
concluded that there is a significant difference
between boards of directors and audit committee
characteristics, such as, CONSTANT, BDSIZE,
ACMEET and ACSIZE.
Conclusions
From the above findings, it may be concluded
that board size, audit committee meetings and its
size, have relationship with the financial reporting
practices, but the CEO tenure and hold, board’s
independence, net income, ACIND, ACLEGEX,
ACACCEX and OVERLAP of audit committee
members on compensation committee, have no
influence on the financial reporting practices.
Thus, it may be inferred that the companies may
improve the financial reporting quality, by
managing the board size, audit committee
meetings and size, as these characteristics have
significant relationship with financial reporting
quality.
Moreover, this study has the limitations as, i)
The study is limited to 133 equity based
companies listed at Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) and selected on the basis of Bill Godden
principle, hence, the results may not represent of
the entire industry or the economy; ii) The study is
based on secondary data only and confined to
analyze the same for establishing the relationship
to understand the impact of select factors on audit
committee quality; iii) The study used the models
developed by the various authors, academicians,
and researchers, after modifying them according to
the need of the study, thus, sometimes the process
of modifications may not truly represent the
desired phenomenon; iv) There may be various
characteristics that determine the audit committee
quality, but the study considered only a few audit
committee quality characteristics, such as,
independency, size, accounting and legal
qualifications of members and number of audit
committee meetings.
Considering the above limitations, it may
suggest to identify other important characteristics
of audit committee quality and consider for future
studies.
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